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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, we are observing an explosion in the proliferation of
clinical data. In this context, a typical example of the well-known
big data problem is represented by the huge amount of Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI) les that need to be stored and analysed.
Although the Cloud computing technology can address such a
demanding problem, data reliability, availability and privacy are
three of the major concerns against the large scale adoption of Cloud
storage systems in the healthcare context - this is why hospitals
are reluctant to move the patients’ data over the Cloud. In this
paper, we focus on data reliability and availability and we discuss
an approach that allows healthcare centres storing clinical data in
a Multi-Cloud storage environment while guaranteeing patients’
privacy. Experiments proved the feasibility of our approach.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) has recently
been gaining popularity in the healthcare sector. As an example,
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every day a huge amount of Magnetic Resonance Tomography
(MRT) are produced and stored as Digital Imaging and COmmuni-
cations in Medicine (DICOM) les. However, most of the traditional
Hospital Information Systems (HIS) are based on old storage tech-
nologies and are not able to manage eciently this huge amount of
data. Cloud Computing and Cloud Storage service providers may
represent a good solution to tackle that problem as they provide
features such as exible storage capacity, automatic and incremen-
tal backups, etc. Unfortunately, the realisation of a private Cloud
for small medium hospitals may not economically be sustainable
due to both purchase and management costs. In this paper we pro-
pose a cheaper multi-cloud storage system based on the integrated
usage of several public Cloud storage providers. However, clinical
centres are still reluctant to store clinical data over the Cloud due
to reliability and privacy concerns, in fact Cloud providers might
discontinue their services or suddenly disappear in the case of a
cyber-attack.
The Cloud storage service is a very interesting topic that can
potantially allow storing huge amounts of data. The business be-
hind the Cloud storage service is demonstrated by the increasing
proliferation of storage providers (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive,
pCloud, Amazon S3 and OneDrive). Dropbox was the rst player
experiencing with this business model, Google Drive provided a
similar service that was followed by many other providers. In order
to guarantee data reliability, a recent trend consists in replicating
data in multiple dierent Cloud storage providers. The advantages
of this new model are evident: if a provider is not able to deliver its
service due to an hardware/software maintenance, data les can
be retrieved from another Cloud Storage Service provider. This fea-
ture turns out being very important for HIS that have to guarantee
specic legal requirements about data availability.
However, if on the one hand the adoption of a multi-Cloud stor-
age system can allow hospitals to guarantee clinical data availability,
on the other hand it can lead to new privacy issues. In fact, if hospi-
tals actually adopt this model they would not have any warranties
about the data privacy of their patients as malicious users can hack
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accounts in order to steal sensitive personal data. Our idea is to
create an innovative Multi-Cloud Storage system for health data
that will be able to solve the well-known data availability, reliability
and privacy issues. Our system is aimed at improving the security
of existing data replication systems such as secrets sharing [8] and
Redundant Residue Number System (RRNS) [3]. Such an approach
can be adopted by a HIS to split clinical data in a set of redundant
chunks with a particular fault-tolerance degree, so that only a sub-
set of those chunks can be enough to reconstruct the original data.
In this way, if we store each chunk of a piece of clinical data in
a dierent Cloud storage provider, the latter will not be able to
reconstruct the original data. In this paper, we specically focus on
a mechanism that allows a HIS to securely track the Cloud storage
providers where the chunks of each clinical data are stored in. Al-
though those data will be scattered across dierent locations/sites,
the HIS will still be able to retrieve the original information when
required. Experiments conducted at the IRCCS “Bonino Pulejo”,
i.e., a clinical and research centre, prove that our approach is able
to track the dissemination and retrieval of big clinical data in a
Multi-Cloud storage environment by considering a MRI case study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
related works. In Section 3 we analyse big MRI data, whereas a HIS
using a Multi-Cloud storage environment is described in Section 4.
Big clinical data dissemination and retrieval are discussed in Section
5. Experiments, considering big MRI data are discussed in Section
6. Conclusion and lights on the future are summarized in Section 7.
2 RELATEDWORK
This scientic work focuses on the creation of a multicloud-based
HIS which is currently a quite new topic as we did not nd any
papers within the same scope produced by the scientic community.
Conversely, storage systems management is a widely debated topic
that is recently gaining more interest with the advent of new cloud
technologies. In [5], the authors describe a technique for optimiz-
ing the le partition considering a Network Storage Environment
(NSE). The authors make XOR operations using splitting and merg-
ing tasks on les that have to be protected. The procedure is hard
to be applicable to scalable scenarios because it requires particular
kernel congurations. In [1], the authors claimed the improvement
of le reliability by introducing redundancies into a large storage
system in dierent ways such as erasure correcting codes used in
RAID levels 5 and 6, and by introducing dierent data placement,
failure detection and recovery disciplines inside a datacenter. Even
in this case the les are divided in chunks. A similar technique
is discussed in [9]. The authors present PRESIDIO, a framework
able to detect similarity and reduce or eliminate redundancy when
objects are stored. The aforementioned works are pretty theoretical
and they are not applicable cloud computing. With regard to big
data storage solution in cloud computing, in [7], the authors dis-
cuss how a cloud based storage system will provide ways for many
organizations to handle increasing amounts of information. A le
partitioning approach is described in [4]. In particular, the authors
present BerryStore, a distributed object storage system designed
for cloud service especially for the massive small les storing. With
a distributed coordinated controller, the proposed system is able
to provide scalability, concurrency, and fault-tolerance. Blocking
les is one of the major critical aspects in big data storage. In order
to solve the shortages of le storage and parallel computing sup-
port issues in xed-blocking storage, in [10], the authors propose
a smart-blocking le storage method. By setting up six grouping
factors, the method can determine whether the le should be au-
tomatically blocked or not, depending on both the le size and
the client bandwidth. A full-stack data storage aimed at clouds is
reported in [6]. The authors investigated the cloud applications
requirements for supporting Data-Intensive Applications at Infras-
tructure as a Service (IaaS) level. They considered Cloud Storage
Resource Management, Cloud Data Access, Metadata Management
and Data Sewing. The common idea of all presented works is the
adoption of a single Cloud Storage provider, instead, in our system
we use a system relying on several Cloud Storage providers.
3 BIG MRI DATA
Nowadays, Magnetic Resonance is a technique widely adopted in
medicine. It was introduced at the beginning of the 1980s. This tool
is very useful, in fact it allows producing very detailed images of
the brain or other parts of the body without the adoption of any X-
Ray but using magnetic elds instead. Each exam usually produces
several thousands of medical images. In order to simplify data trans-
mission, data storing and data analysis the DICOM (Digital Imaging
and Communications in Medicine), an ISO 12052:2006 standard that
join medical images with a specic header, was introduced. The
DICOM header contains several metadata (patient’s name, date of
birth, exam id, exam name, etc). It is composed by hundreds of
TAGs, each of them having a precise meaning. TAGs are formed
by 16 Bytes: 8 of them represent the TAG groupwhereas the others
represent the specic element. We remark that the meaning of the
second group of Bytes is specic for each TAG group. For instance,
considering two dierent groups of TAGs: 0008 representing the
identifying group, and 0010 representing patient group, the meaning
of element 0020 in the former case is the study date whereas in the
latter one is the patient ID.
• group=0008, element=0020→ study date;
• group=0010, element=0020→ patient ID.
We highlight that the size of each DICOM le is a few of kilo-Bytes,
but the total size of an exam is greater than 1 Giga-Bytes because it
include roughly 20000 images.
4 MULTI-CLOUD HOSPITAL STORAGE
SYSTEM
In this Section, rstly we provide an overview of the current trend
in Cloud Storage and propose a new model to use Cloud Storage in
order to store data. Then we discuss on the Multi-Cloud Hospital
Storage system. In our idea the proposed system uses several pub-
lic Clouds Storage provider services (i.e. OneDrive, Google Drive,
pCloud etc) in order to eciently store and manage medical data.
Data security and data privacy are very hot topics in the healthcare
domain and storing medical data in the Cloud might expose the
Hospital Information System to some threats. For what concerns
security, a Cloud Storage provider may not temporarily be able to
provide its service due to a hardware/software maintenance (or in
a worst case, it could disappear without any notice). In respect of
data Privacy, Cloud Storage providers do not assure that malicious
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users can be able to gain the access to data. In order to avoid the
aforementioned issues, we propose an innovative system that se-
curely stores information by spreading user data among dierent
Cloud Storage providers - none of the Cloud providers will have
available the minimum information required to reconstruct original
data les.
The usage of Cloud storage providers is characterized by the
possibility for customers to subscribe to many storage services even
for free (e.g., pCloud, DropBox and Google Drive) and to manually
manage data upload and download. For reliability reasons data can
be replicated in dierent Cloud storage providers at the same time,
however this solution does not solve security and privacy issues.
Figure 1: Storage Cloud Services distributed over the Inter-
net.
Our approach introduces a software layer that abstracts hetero-
geneous Cloud storage providers and allows end-users to upload
their les in an ecient way. Figure 1 shows an example on how
the proposed approach works. The original le A is split in three
chunks, A_1, A_2 and A_3 respectively in pCloud, OneDrive, and
Dropbox. The end-user makes a choice about the level of redun-
dancy of each le, in order to overcome failures in data retrieval or
data loss. Pieces of le or chunks are wrapped into an XML struc-
ture, in order to increase the portability of the system. Any Cloud
storage provider sees the XML le as a body containing a chunk of
the original le encoded in BASE-64. The failure of the metadata
map-le determines the loss of the whole le. To prevent this event
and improve the reliability of the proposed solution, the map-le
has to be stored in the Cloud, but information on chunks distribu-
tion has to be spread over two or more further partial metadata
map-les, and deployed over two or more dierent independent
trusted Cloud providers in order to carry out also medadata ob-
fuscation. Since the trusted providers hold only partial metadata
map-le, no one will be able, by itself, to reconstruct the whole
metadata map-le of any particular user.
The traditional approach used to increase fault tolerance in data
storage is to replicate the whole data. Thus, if we need a 3 degree
of redundancy for le A (that means we can recover A even if 3
les are lost), we need to deploy 4 replicas of A in dierent Cloud
storage providers. Let consider the following two parameters: p is
the minimum number of modules necessary to reconstruct a le
and r is the desired redundancy degree. For example, let consider
a generic le that can be split in p residue-segments, for example
5. In order to have 3 degree of redundancy, if we set r = 3 and we
can recover A even if 3 residue-segment are lost. Further details
regarding RRSN are available in [2].
Our idea is to apply this approach to allow a HIS managing a huge
amount of data generated by current medical devices. Thus, we
designed several specic micro-services thay are able to exchange
data each others and with a replicated central database system
as well as using Cloud Storage and its features as medical exam
repository. In this way the HIS can be cheaper and more powerful,
in fact, Clouds oers unlimited resources according to the pay per
use paradigm. In order to achieve this goal, a HIS should include:
• a replicated central database system able to store all pa-
tient’s data (personal data and the history of all medical
exams);
• a specic micro-service able to store personal data inside
the database system (patient registration service);
• a micro-service able to split medical exams in chunks (data
split service);
• a micro-service able to spread and retrieve data chunks
coming from data split service (data dissemination and
retrieval service);
• a micro-service able to recompose data chunks produced
by data split service and coming from data dissemination
and retrieval service (data re-composition service).
5 SECURE DATA DISSEMINATION AND
RETRIEVAL
Figure 2: Representation of the RRNS encoding/decoding.
After having introduced the general concepts regarding our idea,
in the following we are going to analyse how data is processed
during both the upload and download phases. Figure 2 depicts how
these tasks are carried out: Doctor A uploads a medical exam to
the data split Service, which divides it into chunks and encloses
them into XML les according to the selected redundancy. After
that, the XML les are sent to the data spread and retrieval Service,
which distributes them to dierent cloud service providers and
stores the chunk location in two metadata les through an Obfus-
cation method. Whenever Doctor B wants to reconstruct an exam,
he selects metadata les related to it and sends them to the data
spread and retrieval Service. The latter recovers the original chunks
location based on the metadata les and downloads them accord-
ingly. As showed in Figure 2 some Cloud storage service providers
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may not (temporarily) be able to oer their service (e.g., the red
and the yellow Clouds). In this case our service will download
chunks from the available providers only (i.e., the green Clouds). In
particular, instead of waiting for the transmission of a monolithic
block from the Cloud provider, our service can download dierent
residue-segments in parallel from dierent operators, allowing a
more ecient bandwidth occupation. This same method is used
by the Torrent protocol for increasing the speed of le download-
ing over the Internet. We remark that our system will download
p fragments only to reduce bandwidth occupation, where p is the
minimum number of chunks required in the re-composition phase.
These chunks are sent to the data re-composition Service in order to
build the original exam. At this point Doctor B is able to download
the required exam.
In order to track the location of the uploaded residue-segments,
for each le a metadata map-le is created. In this section we rst
provide some details about the structure of that le, and then we
discuss the obfuscation technique that allows storing this informa-
tion in a safe way. The metadata map-le must be accessible only
from certain enabled doctors that are allowed to rebuild the original
le. Listing 1 shows an example of possible metadata map-le.
Listing 1: Example of possible metadata map-le.
<OWNER> owner Info < /OWNER>
<SEGMENTS> . . . < / SEGMENTS>
<FILE >
[ . . . ]
<CHUNK num= " 11 " > Path / t o / the / S t o r a g e P r o v i d e r X /
94090 e 1 3 8 1 a 1 7 0 0 f b 8 c 3 4 a 0 0 6 9 b c 6 5 3 3 . xml< /CHUNK>
[ . . . ]
< / FILE >
The rst element of the le, OWNER, species the owner informa-
tion. The SEGMENTS element includes the number of necessary
segments required to reconstruct the le (i.e., the value of p). The
FILE element contains a variable number of CHUNK elements. The
CHUNK tag has the attribute num, which refers to the residue-
segment sequence number, its content represents a combination of
the path associated to the front-end application, the Cloud storage
provider for that chunk, and the name of the XML le containing
the data. Information stored within the above XML document will
allow building up the original le during the decoding process.
Depending on the number of available providers and the number
of XML chunks, providers can be in charge of storing one or more
chunks.
Listing 2: Example of the servicelist map-le.
< s e r v i c e l i s t >
<PROVIDER> Path / t o / the / S t o r a g e P r o v i d e r X / <PROVIDER>
<PROVIDER> Path / t o / the / S t o r a g e P r o v i d e r Y / <PROVIDER>
[ . . . ]
< / s e r v i c e l i s t >
Listing 3: Structure of a trusted le.
[ . . . ]
<OWNER> owner Info < /OWNER>
<SEGMENTS> . . . < / SEGMENTS>
<FILE >
[ . . . ]
<CHUNK num= " 11 " >
<CHUNK_REF> 94090 e 1 3 8 1 a 1 7 0 0 f b 8 c 3 4 a 0 0 6 9 b c 6 5 3 3 . xml< / CHUNK_REF>
<UUID_REF> a 7 2 e b b a 5 d 9 b 6 9 5 c 3 9 e 6 d 2 1 9 3 c 3 c b 8 0 5 7 < / UUID_REF>
< /CHUNK>
[ . . . ]
< / FILE >
[ . . . ]
It is straightforward foreseeing that the metadata map-le repre-
sents a key point of the whole process: its accidental lost or un-
availability denitely leads to data loss as retrieving chunks and
rebuilding the le becomes impossible. Thus, keeping the map-le
in the local le system is not ideal. To improve the reliability of
the metadata map-le storing, the data split and retrieve service
also stores the map-le into several Cloud providers. To preserve
data condentiality, the map-le has to be split into dierent partial
medatada map-les to be distributed across dierent independent
trusted Cloud providers. This mechanism can be achieved using
well known security techniques, in particular combining asymmet-
ric and/or symmetric encryption with the MD5 message-digest
algorithm. In order to clarify those ideas, in the following we dis-
cuss a methodology to split the metadata map-le into two partial
metadata map-les using the MD5. In this example, partial metadata
map-les are called servicelist and trusted. The servicelist le is an
XML document containing the list of storage providers wherewith
hospital holds an a priori agreement. Listing 2 shows an example
of a servicelist map-le. The structure of a trusted le is shown in
Listing 3. The rst two elements of the le are equal to the ones
specied in the map-le. The CHUNK tag within the FILE element
has the attribute num, which refers to the fragment order and the
child elements CHUNK_REF and UUID_REF respectively identies
the name of the XML le containing the data associated to that
chunk and the MD5 digest of the fragment location. The UUID_REF
does not contain the actual service provider in order to obfuscate
this information to the storage provider where the le will be up-
loaded. In fact, the unique identier is obtained by applying the
MD5 to the couple (chunk , provider) in order to prevent brute
force attacks aiming at identifying the actual paths associated to
the chunks. Uploading the two partial metadata les instead of the
Figure 3:map le reconstruction.
actual whole metadata map-le to dierent trusted Cloud providers,
guarantees knowledge about the le partitioning to the end-user
only. This task is highlighted in Figure 3. Starting from serviceList
and trusted les, in order to reconstruct the metadata map-le, for
each CHUNK element, the data split retrieval service concatenates
the content of elements PROVIDER contained in the servicelist le
to CHUNK_REF content, calculates the MD5 of the new string and
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compares it to value of the UUID_REF element. We have two possi-
ble cases: strings are equal or not. The equality of two values means
that the system has found the correct chunk location and can write
this information into the metadata-map le, vice versa, if two values
are dierent the system iterates over other providers present in ser-
vicelist le. In the next Section, we specically focus on evaluating
how the obfuscation algorithm works considering dierent degree
of redundancy and multiple Cloud storage providers.
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this Section, we discuss the data retrieval performances of our
system in four dierent congurations, respectively using: 6, 8,
10 and 12 dierent Cloud storage providers. In our experiments,
we store a chunk per each Cloud storage provider. In particular
using the Wrapper described in the previous Section, we simulated
6 datasets respectively composed by 1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000 and
100000 File wrappers. In our scenario we stored serviceList wrap-
per in a local machine, trusted wrappers instead are stored in a
remote machine, in this way we simulated the presence of a third
trusted part able to store our information. The system was deployed
in two dierent blades, compute machine is composed by CPU: In-
tel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40GHz, RAM 16GB, OS: Ubuntu
server 16.04 LTS 64 BIT. Remote machine instead is composed by
CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-6100 CPU @ 3.70GHz, RAM 16GB, OS:
Ubuntu server 16.04 LTS 64 BIT. Machines are connected by Virtual
Private Network. After that we spread chunks on dierent Cloud
storage providers, starting from servicelist and trusted wrappers
we evaluate the time to reconstruct map wrapper. Listing 4 shows
the pseudo-code of the reconstruction task.
Listing 4: Pseudo-code of the reconstruction task.
. . .
l i s t S e r v i c e s = r e a d F r o m S e r v i c e L i s t ( ) ;
l i s t O b f u s c a t e d C h u n k s = readFromTrus ted ( ) ;
f o r e a c h obfusca tedChunk i n l i s t O b f u s c a t e d C h u n k s :
c learChunk = r e c o n s t r u c t ( l i s t S e r v i c e s , ob fusca tedChunk ) ;
map . add ( c learChunk ) ;
. . .
return map ;
For each dataset, we respectively performed the same operations
30 consecutive times, so as to obtain mean execution times and
corresponding condence intervals at 95%. The histogram of Figure
4 compares the execution times to reconstruct 10000 map wrapper
les considering 6, 8, 10 and 12 providers that corresponds to 6,
8, 10, 12 chunks. Execution time is acceptable. In particular, we
observe that increasing the number of considered providers we
get an acceptable response time. In fact, the execution time of the
conguration including 12 providers, present a delay of roughly
9000ms compared to the conguratoin including 6 providers. This
means that increasing the number of replication does not have a
meaningful impact on performances. This results prove that the
proposed approach is suitable for HIS managing big MRI data over
a Multi-Cloud storage system.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we discussed an approach that allows a HIS to manage
big clinical data in a Multi-Cloud storage system. In particular, we
discussed a service able to spread and retrieve chunks of clinical
Figure 4: Execution time for 10000 wrapper les.
data among dierent Cloud Storage providers. In order to map the
chunk distribution, we introduced three dierent XML wrapper
les adopting an obfuscation algorithm. This scientic work is the
rst initiative adopting a Multi-Cloud storage solution for HIS and
for this reason we did not nd any solution to compare performance
of our system. However, experiments showed that our system re-
sponse time presents a linear trend. The execution time grows up
with the increasing number of considered Cloud storage providers.
In future works, we plan to improve security functionalities using
an encryption algorithm on XML wrappers. Moreover, we plan to
switch from XML to JSON wrappers in order to push down parsing
and processing times and in order to store information inside a
NoSql document database.
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